Central Asian Security and Water/ Energy Relations between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan by Kakhkharov, Jakhongir
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Central Asian Security and Water/
Energy Relations between Uzbekistan
and Tajikistan
Jakhongir Kakhkharov
Griffith University
2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64024/
MPRA Paper No. 64024, posted 5. May 2015 04:09 UTC
1 
 
CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY AND WATER/ ENERGY RELATIONS BETWEEN 
UZBEKISTAN AND TAJIKISTAN 
 
JAHANGIR KAKHAROV 
 
 
Currently, Uzbekistan is the largest electricity producer among the Central Asian republics and a 
net exporter of electricity. The country has a total installed generation capacity of 12,300 MW. 
Uzbekistan achieved self-sufficiency in energy after gaining independence in 1991. Today, about 
50% of power generating facilities of the Central Asia Integrated Power Grid is located in 
Uzbekistan. This power grid also incorporates the power systems of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan.  
 
However, maintenance of Uzbekistan’s power systems has deteriorated over the past years. 
Much of the equipment in generation, transmission and distribution systems is outdated and 
inefficient. At present it needs serious renovation and upgrading to meet the growing demand of 
the economy. The facilities require rehabilitation by introducing more efficient and environment 
friendly equipment, so that they can operate at their design capacities.  
 
The Tajikistan Energy System’s installed capacity is 4,354.5 MW. The annual average power 
generation of the hydropower plants is 15-17,000 GWh. The Nurek hydropower plant of 3,000 
MW installed capacity is the biggest in Central Asia. It has the seasonal-storage reservoir of 10.5 
billion m
3
, and it regulates the Vaksh flow for the irrigation needs in the Amu Darya basin 
countries. The Nurek hydro structure operates in the irrigation regime at the beginning and in the 
middle of the growing season (June - July) to meet the interests of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
and Uzbekistan, which results in significant direct winter electricity losses for Tajikistan.  
 
Therefore, Tajikistan has to buy power in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan, and pay 
for it hard currency. The power system of Tajikistan experiences shortages in winter and 
surpluses in summer within the range of 1 to 1.5 kWh. The Soviet period electricity transfer 
system was destroyed. During the Soviet period, the republics sharing the Amu Darya were also 
involved in water-energy transfers directed from Moscow. Tajikistan received Turkmen and 
Uzbek gas in return for electricity produced to power irrigation pumps in summer. Tajikistan 
also received electricity from Uzbekistan during winter. After the Soviet collapse, bilateral trade 
replaced this arrangement. Tajikistan, for instance, unable to cover domestic energy demand 
through hydropower production, continues to import Uzbek electricity and gas. The latter is used 
in Tajikistan’s thermal power plants. The UNDP (2005) notes that given the diverse national 
interests, the post-independence years have seen a serious weakening of the longstanding Soviet 
water and energy exchange arrangement among the republics. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the 
upstream countries along the two main rivers of the region—the Amu Darya and the Syr 
Darya—prefer to maximize the use of the water for generating electricity for export and to meet 
domestic energy demand, especially in the winter. The downstream countries, Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, prefer to have maximum access to water for irrigation during the 
summer months, while also avoiding the floods caused by winter water releases. To cope with 
these interrelationships in regional trade, the Central Asian governments have resorted to 
bilateral and multilateral agreements that determine the quantities of water and energy (coal, 
electricity, and gas) that are exchanged between the countries and the values at which they are 
exchanged. The ADB report (2002) notes that pricing is the key to providing incentives for 
power trade. Regional approaches to the water-energy nexus in Central Asia would bring large 
benefits in terms of more efficient management of these scarce resources, a greater potential for 
exports of electricity, more reliable availability for communities and a reduction in the potential 
for conflict. However, such regional solutions would require compromises involving each 
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country’s interests and principles, and a fundamental trust that agreements once entered would 
actually be implemented. 
 
In 2008 Uzbekistan generated 50.1 billion kW/h of electric power, which was 2.3% more 
compared with 2007.
i
 Uzbekistan decreased electricity production by 1.8% in the first 6 months 
of 2009 to 25.2 billion kilowatt-hours.
ii
 Renovation of the energy sector is a priority for the 
government of Uzbekistan. The growing demand for electricity and the wear and tear of the 
existing power generating facilities in the country has motivated the government to develop a 
long term program for the reconstruction and development of the sector during 2001-2010. In 
December 2001, the Government of Uzbekistan approved a Generating Capacity Development 
and Rehabilitation Programme for the Energy Sector until 2010 envisaging an increase in the 
installed capacity of national power stations by 15% by 2010, which requires investments to the 
tune of $1 billion.  
 
Exports of electricity from Uzbekistan reached $16.9 million in 2005. Electricity mainly 
exported to the neighboring countries (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan during winter period) and 
Afghanistan. Tajikistan imports around 600 million kWt/h of electric power and 700 million 
cubic meters of natural gas from Uzbekistan during winter season and exports around 900 
million kWt/h during the summer period. Natural gas is supplied to Tajikistan from January 1, 
2007 at $100 per 1,000 cubic meters.
iii
 According to the State Statistics Committee of Tajikistan, 
the import of electric power made up 4.6 billion kWt/h in the first 11 months of 2006. This cost 
the country US$63.1 million. The export of electric power (Tajikistan currently exports its 
electric power to Afghanistan only) made up 4.02 billion kWt/h (US$46.8 million).  
  
Bilateral trade is not without its problems, though. Uzbekistan has several times cut gas supplies 
to Tajikistan due to the latter’s inability to pay in cash, and Uzbek gas supplies are often 
unreliable due to low pipeline pressure. Only at the beginning of 2007, did Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan at last resolve the issue of Uzbekistan's debt of 5 million dollars to the Barq-I Tojik 
[Tajik electricity] energy company. Tajikistan obtained an opportunity to import and export the 
necessary volume of electricity via Uzbek power grids in exchange for the debt.
iv
 
 
The World Bank (2004a and 2004b) and the International Crisis Group (2002) note that the Amu 
Darya shares a number of features with the Syr Darya, notably its trans-boundary nature and its 
division into upstream hydropower use and downstream irrigation use. One major difference 
between the two is the extent to which they can be regulated. While up to 70 per cent of the 
annual flow on the Syr Darya can be stored, the equivalent figure for Amu Darya is merely 30 
per cent. This lack of storage capacity reduces the Amu Darya’s potential for the kind of 
upstream/downstream dispute over hydropower and irrigation that characterizes the use of the 
Syr Darya.  
 
However, there are other, potential and developing sources of actual or potential conflicts 
involving the waters of the Amu Darya. For instance, Tajikistan’s plans for expanding upstream 
hydropower capacity by completing a number of dams unfinished from Soviet days have roused 
concern in Uzbekistan.  
 
In an attempt to reduce its energy dependence on Uzbekistan, Tajikistan is currently 
contemplating how it can exploit its huge hydropower potential—only 10 per cent of which has 
been developed. Tajikistan is actively pursuing the completion of two hydropower schemes 
initiated during the Soviet period. According to the former minister of energy of Tajikistan 
Nurmakhmatov, capital investments to the tune of $2 billion into the Rogun and Sangruda in the 
course of 5-7 years, the country may generate electricity for exports minimum 10 billion kWt/h a 
year. When these stations become operational power generation in Tajikistan will reach 31-33 
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billion kWt/h a year. It is estimated that domestic demand for electricity in Tajikistan will reach 
about 23-25 billion kWt/h a year in 5-7 years. 
 
Sangtuda I+II, involves two run-of-river schemes (670 MW and 220 MW) at the incremental 
cost of $560 million. These could produce electricity at the low cost of 0.0197 $/kWh.
v
 The 
Chinese Ambassador in Tajikistan recently confirmed that the project to construct a Zeravshan 
hydropower station (block I of Sangtuda) is under consideration in China.
vi
 Tajikistan intends to 
construct this station within 36 months with the assistance of a soft loan from China to the tune 
of $269 million (with maturity of 25 years and interest rate of 1%). Uzbekistan strongly opposes 
this project as this may jeopardize irrigation water flow and the future of agriculture in Bukhara, 
Samarkand and Navoi provinces of Uzbekistan and point to other projects in Tajikistan such as 
Dashtidjumskiy, Kokchinskiy, and Djumarskiy as more acceptable and expedient. Uzbekistan 
also considers this project as violation of international agreements on the use of trans-border 
water objects and proposes the creation of an authorized committee to evaluate the potential 
damage with the right to veto projects in the power sector.
vii
 The Uzbek authorities have used 
punitive measures to express their displeasure with existing Tajik policies, as well as future 
plans. For example, Uzbekistan has disrupted the delivery of Kyrgyz electricity to one of 
Tajikistan’s major industrial concerns, the Tajik Aluminum Plant, located in the southwestern 
city of Tursunzade. The fact that, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have had a contentious relationship 
for years, driven in large measure by perceptions in Tashkent that Tajik President Imomali 
Rahmonov’s administration was not strong enough to deal adequately with Islamic radicalism, 
which emerged as a regional threat in the late 1990s, doesn’t help in finding solutions to 
problems of cooperation between the two countries in power sector.
viii
 The Tajik government 
argues that construction of this power station will not affect water supply in Uzbekistan. This 
project may receive Iranian and Russian financial support. However, considering Tajikistan’s 
limited financial capacity and the uncertain market outlook for incremental electricity capacity in 
the country and beyond, the prospects for mobilizing the required funding remains uncertain. 
 
The other project, Rogun I+II is a 3,600 MW storage scheme at an incremental cost of $2,455 
million that could start producing electricity in 2014. Rogun I+II is even more controversial than 
Sangtuda I+II, basically because it enables Tajikistan to control the flow of water to 
Uzbekistan’s Surkhandarya and Kashkadarya provinces, while potentially expanding irrigation at 
home. Uzbekistan is strongly opposed to the completion of Rogun I+II as well. The project has a 
favorable economic cost of 0.0283 $/kWh, but if pursued it could create upstream/downstream 
irrigation/hydropower conflict. On April 26, Tajik officials announced the collapse of a $1-
billion deal, under which the Russian aluminum concern OAO Rusal was supposed to construct a 
hydropower plant, known as the Rogun Dam. Rusal is also embroiled in a dispute with Tajik 
officials over efforts to modernize the same aluminum plant in Tursunzade. Tajik authorities 
suspect that Uzbek political pressure prompted Rusal to scale back plans for Rogun construction 
and aluminum plant modernization at Tursunzade.
ix
 Some other “outcomes” of this tension 
between the two countries are difficulties in obtaining visas to visit both countries for travelers 
from both countries and the blockade of railway passages.  
 
Tajikistan’s growing energy needs require these investments. Otherwise, the country faces power 
collapse and this shouldn’t be ignored by the neighbors. In this light, increased intra-regional 
trade could provide significant benefits by allowing individual countries to meet future demand 
at a lower cost than if they were to rely solely on their domestic resources. For example, 
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan could both benefit from importing hydroelectricity from existing 
hydropower stations in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan during the summer, rather than generating 
power in their own thermal power stations. The exploitation of differences in the marginal cost 
of production across countries and seasons, however, requires a much greater level of 
transparency in the electricity sectors of the various countries. 
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Central Asia has considerable electricity export potential. Possible markets such as Pakistan and 
Iran have the added attraction of experiencing their peak demand in the summer, when the 
largest electricity surpluses exist in Central Asia. Access to these markets will particularly 
benefit Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, since they could develop the capacity to export significant 
quantities of electricity. Uzbekistan and to some extent Kazakhstan could export thermal power 
in the winter, and also serve as transit countries and power traders. According to World Bank 
(2004a), the Central Asian Republics will need to get an intra-regional agreement on electricity 
transit in place for having access to export markets including Pakistan, Iran and some other 
countries. Major new power generation projects in Central Asia will only be feasible if there is 
assured access to export markets outside the region. Western investors currently view the new 
generation projects as high-risk ventures. Pakistan and Iran have the added attraction of 
experiencing their peak demand in the summer when the largest potential electricity surpluses 
exist in Central Asia. Once agreements are in place they will then have to be carefully managed 
to ensure the benefits from intra-regional trade are optimized. Access to these markets like 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, China and Russia will particularly benefit the Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan since they are the countries with the potential to export significant quantities of 
electricity. Uzbekistan (and to some extent Kazakhstan), have the potential to export thermal 
power in the winter and also benefit in their role as prospective transit countries and as potential 
power traders. 
 
In order to promote regional cooperation in the power sector the ADB allocated a loan for a 
Regional Power Transmission Modernization project. In doing so ADB was aware of the fact 
that a prime obstacle to energy trade is that governments in the region have had self-sufficiency 
as a policy goal. The effect is that some republics are generating electricity using high-value 
fossil fuels rather than importing electricity from neighboring countries with surplus electricity 
generated from renewable, lower-cost resources. There has also been a tendency in some 
countries to limit access to their transmission lines to countries wishing to trade with third 
countries.  
 
The ADB (2002) points out that a distorted system of energy prices is a significant barrier for 
greater regional cooperation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Primary energy sources for 
thermal power generation are frequently and grossly undervalued (e.g., in Uzbekistan the gas 
price for power generation is about one fifth of the export or border price). Also, there is no 
value attributed to water regulation for irrigation. For power trade to work it is necessary for both 
buyer and seller to receive an economic advantage. This is possible only in an environment of 
undistorted prices of electricity and primary fuels for power generation. Hydropower plants are 
able to quickly increase or decrease output compared to thermal plants, which allows them to be 
used to follow changes in demand. Hydropower plants are also able to restart or blackstart the 
whole power system in the event of a system-wide collapse. Finally, as power tariffs are below 
long-run marginal costs, power utilities cannot create the revenues that are required to sustain 
power system operation, let alone trade. 
 
As noted above, currently, exchange of power is governed by agreements under which 
government officials of the various countries decide in regular meetings on the quantities to be 
imported and exported within a given time period. This exchange of power is often linked to the 
exchange of fossil fuels and water allocations for irrigation. The ADB (2002) suggests that an 
electricity market to work it will be essential to decouple the electricity trade from water and the 
trade in fuels. Barter and political allocation of commodities need to be transformed into traded 
energy and traded feedstocks (such as coal and gas) with separate markets for each. Water 
allocation must be on a fair and equitable basis and costs of water storage and regulation must be 
adequately compensated.  
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With this in mind the ADB made signing of power trade agreement between Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan as a condition precedent for loan disbursement. According to this agreement power 
trade between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan should have been direct between legal entities on both 
sides and based on market prices for power. The agreement envisaged voluntary cross-border 
trade on the basis of genuinely independent electricity utilities that are managed according to 
economic principles, with no political interference. Barter trade would decline over the transition 
period. This ADB project would provide three key building blocks: rehabilitation of substations, 
augmentation of the control systems, and enhanced metering. The other key elements of the 
project were legal/regulatory compatibility, transmission ownership, open access transmission, 
more comprehensive sales contracts, transmission pricing, voluntary trading, a grid code, a 
metering code, ancillary services pricing, and hard currency contracts and settlement. The 
trading envisaged would have been a mixture of long- and short term contracts between the 
respective utilities on the basis of mutual economic advantage. In other words, the power 
relations between the legal entities of both countries would have taken place in a regulated 
market and should have lead to more efficient and fair allocation of resources. Uzbekistan’s and 
Tajikistan’s energy companies even signed the agreement, which was supposed to be approved 
by the governments of both countries. However, this agreement was not approved and the loan 
was cancelled.  
 
The main reasons for not signing the power trade agreement and abandoning this loan which 
would definitely contribute to regional cooperation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in power 
sector were the following: 
 
- The financial framework didn’t not exist that would allow an efficient settlement of 
transactions in those cases where they are not barter-based and are dollarized.  
- Potential problems of currency convertibility and absence of bank guarantees easily 
available, if at all, for such transactions.  
- Potential nonpayment across borders.  
- The desire to preserve energy security on both sides. 
 
It is regretful that such a project so useful for regional cooperation was not realized. Given that 
peak electricity usage is time sensitive and the major population centers of the region are spread 
over different time zones, economizing on peak generation capacity alone would provide a 
strong rationale for energy trade. Trading also would allow substantial economizing on reserve 
capacity. Lower overall generation costs would result from increased trade. Since there are huge 
hydropower resources available in Tajikistan, while Uzbekistan has significant reserves of fossil 
fuels, these two would complement each other to achieve least-cost generation. Also, by working 
as one large integrated system, operating costs could have been reduced as a consequence of 
reduced individual spinning reserve requirements, the joint provision of and exchange of 
ancillary services, the possibility to support and better supply loads at the periphery of an 
individual system, and generally an increased service quality and reliability standards of power 
supply. The feasibility study of the ADB consultants estimated that if the project were to begin in 
2002/2003, these benefits would be in the order of $25–30 million per year by 2011, assuming 
that power would be supplied from the low-cost generation (hydropower) countries to the other 
countries. Reduced capacity requirements result, since reserve capacities can be used jointly and 
thus the total installed reserve capacity can be lower. Pooling of reserve capacities makes it 
possible to reduce future expansion of power system generation and reduce total capital required 
for new power stations. Moreover, for future expansion planning it would have been possible to 
coordinate power system expansion planning and take advantage of economies of scale through 
the installation of large generation units that would not be viable in the individual systems. 
Finally, lower capacity requirements could have also result from the fact that peak load hours 
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slightly differ amongst the Central Asian countries. It is thus possible to improve the overall 
system load factor and equalize the daily load curve. ADB consultants estimated that with trade, 
900 MW of additional capacity could be avoided, the fixed cost savings of which would be about 
$40 million per year. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan would enjoy a share of the above benefits. 
In the short term the benefits of enhanced trade were estimated on the basis that agreement is 
reached for Uzbekistan to import the surplus summer energy available from the Nurek power 
station in Tajikistan, on average 1,000 GWh per year as envisaged in the bilateral Power Trade 
Relations Agreement. Instead of spilling and wasting this water, as at present, the net economic 
benefit that could have been shared by both countries was estimated at $12 million based on 1.2 
c/kWh. The benefit is calculated as avoided generation costs (fuel and variable cost) to 
Uzbekistan of 1.9 c/kWh less transmission cost of 0.5 c/kWh and the negligible Tajik generation 
cost of 0.2 c/kWh. The share of the benefit would have been based on the price agreed. The 
upper bound price that Uzbekistan could pay is 1.65 c/kWh and the lower bound price that 
Tajikistan could accept is 0.45 c/kWh, assuming transmission costs are equally shared. This 
gives a clear demonstration of the potential benefits of trade and would, if included in the 
foregoing viability analysis, significantly enhance returns. However, since there is no direct trade 
now, each country have to provide its own reserve capacity, the sum of which is much higher 
than the reserve capacity of an integrated system. Thus no direct trade option was attained at a 
very high cost. 
 
The present power trade situation is characterized by barter deals and technical dispatch. It is not 
based on economic considerations. Southern Kazakhstan imports power from Turkmenistan 
(wheeled through Uzbekistan) and the Kyrgyz Republic receives power from north Kazakhstan 
as well. The Kyrgyz Republic imports power from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and exports power 
to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan (at different times of the year). Tajikistan imports 
power from the Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan and exports power to the 
Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. Turkmenistan exports power mainly to Tajikistan but also 
small amounts to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The energy trade picture is further complicated by 
exports and imports of gas for power production and by the inclusion of water for irrigation in 
the present exchange agreements. 
 
In sum, both Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s losses from non cooperation in the power sector are 
huge. Multilateral agencies have been trying to engage both countries in cooperation in this 
sector for many years without significant success. The relations between the countries were 
aggravated by past disagreements on other issues that provoked mutual distrust. One possible 
solution to this dilemma is to engage third parties to act as independent negotiating brokers. 
Since Russia is already a significant player in the energy sector of both countries, this role could 
potentially be fulfilled by Russia, if Russia can prove their independence and objectivity to both 
sides. It is also in the interests of Russia because this will allow them to preserve their influence 
in both countries in a situation when both countries are looking for additional geopolitical 
partners.  
 
 
V  Conclusion 
 
The UNDP (2005) argues that developing a consensus and implementing follow-up action for 
regional cooperation and integration cannot happen overnight. In view of the many obstacles of 
history, current politics and institutional weaknesses, and bearing in mind the slow progress with 
similar efforts elsewhere in the world, one must realistically expect that serious progress with 
regional cooperation and integration will take years, and even decades.  
 
7 
 
The efforts to improve regional cooperation in Central Asia in the area of trade should focus on 
improving trade regimes in the countries in coordination with the WTO entry process, 
developing market economy and democratic institutions, harmonization of trade and customs 
policies, removing significant trade barriers such as taxes on imports that are not levied on 
domestically produced goods or that have higher rates for imported than domestically produced 
goods, foreign currency conversion problems, export bans on some products, and crack downs 
on shuttle traders. 
 
In the power sector between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan there is a need for strong 
negotiator/broker to mediate the negotiation process inductive to greater cooperation in this 
important sector. Russia might be suitable for this role provided they prove to be fair to both 
sides. Cooperation between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan could bring sizeable gains for both 
countries but this also means that the governments should curtail energy self-sufficiency as a 
policy goal, tackle a distorted system of energy prices, and deal with potential nonpayment 
problems across borders.  
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